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I. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE FULL EXTENT OF ITS
COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH WITNESS LYMAN IS PREJUDICIAL
ERROR
A. Factual Background.
Prior to trial, Mr. Bisner filed a discovery request asking for a list of witnesses, witness
rap sheets, and the "details of any written or oral cooperation agreement[s]. ... " CR, 59. Five
days before trial the prosecutor informed the defense of a witness named Chris Lyman. CR 744.
Lyman allegedly sold drugs to Mr. Bisner on the evening of the shooting. Lyman told the jury
that on the day of the shooting Mr. Bisner stated that someone owed Mr. Bisner money and
"[s]omebody is going to die tonight." TR. Lyman, 5. The prosecutor argued that this was "the
only evidence" ofMr. Bisner's intent to commit murder. TR. Closing, 23-24.
The day before trial, the prosecutor was contacted by Lyman's attorney, Walter Bugden.
Mr. Bugden sought immunity against prosecution for Mr. Lyman. The prosecutor told Lyman's
attorney that "if Chris Lyman were to testify about the drug transaction, the State would not
prosecute him for it," CR 679, in essence, giving Lyman use immunity for his testimony. The
prosecutor did not disclose the contents of that discussion to the defense before trial.
In its brief the state claims no error because no "promises or inducements were made" to
witness Lyman or his attorney. Instead, the state asserts "(1) the prosecution made no ...
agreement with [Lyman or his attorney], and (2) the defense learned of the [attorney
Bugden/prosecution] conversation before the State rested and therefore had ample opportunity to
use it in his case." These assertions, however, are inconsistent with the trial record.

B. The Prosecutor Both Failed to Disclose the Information and Continually Objected
when the Defense Questioned the Witness in an Effort to Discover the Information

1

During trial, defense counsel attempted to question Lyman about discussions with the
listrict attorney and/or city attorney. Instead of disclosing the pre-trial discussion about Lyman's
tmmunity request, the prosecutor objected and told the judge "I don't know what [defense
counsel's] referring this to ... I think the witness is confused .... " TR.Lyman, 7. The
prosecutor objected later in the cross-examination when defense counsel again sought to discover
the content of discussions with the district attorney. TR. Lyman, 9. The misrepresentation
continued in closing argument when the state falsely argued that "[Lyman] wasn't given any
promise ... okay, there is something about the city prosecutor or judge in Sandy, but absolutely

nothing to do with us, the people involved in this case." TR.Closing, 52 (emphasis added)
The prosecutor's post-trial statement that he would not or could not prosecute Lyman
neither excuses his misrepresentations nor his duty to disclose the exculpatory information to the
defense. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("The prudent prosecutor will resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.")(quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 US. 97, 108
(1976)); State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 813-14 (Utah 1999) ("It is not for a prosecutor to
substitute his or her judgment for that of a defendant with respect to whether exculpatory
evidence is sufficiently material to warrant disclosure to a defendant when the question is at all a
close call."); Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261 n. 6 (lOth Cir. 2000). (even though key witness's
guilt "could not be proven in a court oflaw," prosecution still had duty to disclose information
about allegations of theft and other misconduct investigated by sheriff); State v. Knight, 734 P 2d
at 917 (incomplete discovery response "not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but has
the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist.").
Here, Lyman's drug dealing employment naturally caused him fear of prosecution. He

2

was sophisticated enough to retain a lawyer, testified with the assurance that he would not be
prosecuted, and undoubtedly believed he benefitted from the agreement. Bragan v. Morgan, 791
F. Supp. 704, 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). Assured of no prosecution here, Lyman had a powerful
motive to curry favor with the state and "to shift suspicion away from himself ... ," and onto Mr.
Bisner as a more culpable party. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,311 (1974); see Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (credibility of state witness was "an important issue in the case, and
evidence of any understanding or agreement as to future prosecution would be relevant to his
credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it."); State v. Chesnut, 621 P. 2d 1228, 123 3 (Utah
1980) ("The mere possibility of future charges is a sufficient basis to explore the motives of the
witness on cross-examination, and place his apprehensions thereof before the jury."); Nuckols,
233 F.3d at 1265 (undisclosed impeachment evidence was important in showing witness's
"attempt to ingratiate himself with the Sheriff and deflect dissatisfaction with his [mis]conduct.").
Impeachment with the use of this evidence was critical to question Lyman's motive in testifying.

See Nukols, 233 F.3d at 1267 ("Because impeachment of the witness who held the key to
successful prosecution was denied to the defense, we have no doubt Petitioner suffered prejudice
as a consequence.").
Lyman was a key witness whose testimony formed the primary basis by which the
prosecution proved intent. 1 Failure to disclose that crucial evidence was prejudicial to Mr.

1

At trial Lyman testified that as follows:

A. Lyman: [Bisner] mentioned that someone owed him a small amount of money, $300,
something in that area, and that they were going to be meeting with this individual that
night.
Q. [Prosecutor]: He (sic) say anything else about that?
(Footnote continued on next page)
3

lisner' s case. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 ("we cannot speculate as to whether the jury as sole judges
>f the credibility of witnesses, would have accepted [the defense claim of bias] ... , [b ]ut we do
;onclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that
they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness's] testimony
which provided a crucial link in the proofof[defendant's] act."); see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55
(failure to disclose leniency promise made to important witness is ground for reversal); Nuckols,
233 F.3d at 1267 (although prosecution claimed that withheld impeachment evidence was not
material, Tenth Circuit reversed noting that question of credibility, that could have been shown

A Yeah, out of context, you know, kind of on the way out he said, "Somebody is going
to die tonight," but ... I don't know.
Q. On the way out? So he had told you that they were going to meet with somebody that
night about-who owed him money?
A Uh-huh.
Q. And when they left he said, "Someone is going to die tonight?"
A Yes, sir.
TR., Lyman, 5.
The prosecutor relied on this testimony in closing to prove the mens rea element of intent:
Just a few hours before this happened, around 10:00, 10:30, four hours beforehand, Mr.
Bisner was at Chris Lyman's house. They were talking about weapons and guns and
assault weapons. Mr. Bisner told Chris that he was to meet a man that night who owed
him some money and that someone was going to die. Intentional. Someone was going to
die, he promised four hours before this happened.
TR. Closing, 15.

In fact the only evidence of his belief that night we have is that four hours later-excuse
me, four hours earlier [Mr. Bisner] told Chris Lyman that someone was going to die that
night. Now, that, ladies and gentlemen, is the only evidence of what was going on in the
defendant's mind that morning or evening.
TR. Closing, 23-24.

4

with undisclosed evidence, "should have been resolved by the jury.").
The manner in which the evidence was presented and the prosecutor's numerous
objections make it unlikely that the defense knew the promise not to prosecute Lyman for his drug
dealing activities. Given the importance ofLyman's testimony, attacking his credibility was
critical to Mr. Eisner's defense. See Nuckols, 233 F.3d at 1267 (failure to disclose impeachment
evidence against key witness was reversible error because it prevented defense from testing
witness's "credibility in the crucible of cross-examination.").

Here, trial counsel's failure to ask

Lyman about retaining a lawyer and seeking a promise not to prosecute suggests that the defense
did not know of this evidence at trial? See Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico Dep 't of

Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 829 (lOth Cir. 1995) ("perhaps the most highly probative evidence
relating to the disclosure vel non of this report is the conspicuous absence of any crossexamination of [the witness] on the matters contained in [the undisclosed] report, matters that
were extremely relevant to [defendant's] defense."). Defense knowledge is additionally unlikely
in light of the repeated defense requests for this information both before and during trial. Instead,
of disclosing this information when the defense asked Lyman general questions about possible
deals, the prosecutor objected to those questions. Indeed, the prosecution concluded its case in
closing by telling the jury that "[Lyman] wasn't given any promise .... " TR. Closing, 52. See

Giglio, 405 U.S. at 152, (prosecutor's misrepresentation in closing that crucial witness "received
no promises that he would not be prosecuted" was important factor in court's reversal of
conviction.).

2

When the defense attempted to ask about possible conversations with personnel from the
district attorney's office, the prosecution objected.

5

C. The State Participated in the Post-Notice of Appeal Proceedings.
The government next contends that Mr. Bisner waived any claim to challenge the noniisclosure of cooperation agreements with witnesses Koontz, Pearson, and Symes They argue
~hat the notice of appeal, which was filed on December 30, 1999, invalidated all subsequent

actions taken by the parties and the trial court. While a filing of a notice ordinarily divests the trial
court of jurisdiction, in this case both parties continued to supplement the record with affidavits,
legal memoranda and legal argument. The state participated in the post-notice of appeal
proceedings thereby waiving any claim that the post-notice of appeal record is invalid. State v.

Belgard, 830 P.2d 265-66 (Utah 1992)(when trial court proceeds to consider claim raised postjudgment, then matter is properly preserved for appeal); State v. Beason, 2 P 3d 459, 462 (Utah
App. 2000) ("Because the trial court addressed the alleged error rather than finding it waived the
court granted defendant relief from his waiver and defendant's right to assert the issue on appeal
was preserved."); State v. Searle, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993).
The court here should consider the post-notice of appeal record chiefly because the state
waived any objection by participating in the post-notice of appeal proceedings. Here both sides
filed pleadings and memoranda, 3 while the court held hearings and issued rulings as if the court
had jurisdiction over the matter. 4
Moreover, it seems unjust to strike the post-notice of appeal matters from the record,

3

See CR. 744-47, 754-58, 759-88 (Affidavits and other pleadings submitted by state and
defense); CR, 789-90 (State memorandum).
4

The final ruling of the trial court in this matter, issued February 9, 2000, indicated that if
the parties could not resolve their factual differences, an evidentiary hearing would be necessary.
CR, 881. The court contemplated having both trial counsel testify at that hearing.

6

when allegations of prosecutorial misconduct created the need for the additional hearings. This
court should not sanction the state's misconduct by claiming the matter to be waived, especially in
light of the completed record before the court.
Consideration of this claim is also supported by the general purpose of the rules of
appellate procedure which allow for supplementation of the record "to conform to the truth."
Utah R. App. P. 11(h) ("If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the

record made to conform to the truth. ")(emphasis added); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 477
(Utah 1990). 5 Here, the prosecutor's promises of leniency were not disclosed until after the
notice of appeal was filed. Both Mr. Bisner and the prosecutor supplemented the record to make
that record "conform to the truth." Mr. Bisner should not be penalized by the state's misconduct
in failing to timely disclose exculpatory information.

D. The State 's Incomplete Response to the Defense Discovery Request had the Effect of
Representing that the Evidence Did Not Exist.

Here, the state's incomplete response had the additional effect of representing to Mr.
Bisner that Koontz and Pearson received no special consideration for their testimony. An
incomplete response to a discovery request conveys the impression that the evidence does not
exist and may affect an accused's right to a fair trial:
an incomplete response to a specific discovery request not only deprives the defense of
certain evidence, but has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does

5

Mr. Bisner sought to remand this matter back to the trial court for consideration and
findings pertaining to the non-disclosure of the Koontz, Pearson and Symes cooperation
agreements. That motion was denied on August 31, 2000. Of course, the record on that issue is
largely complete and is part of the court file in this case negating the necessity of a remand.
7

not exist In reliance on this misleading representation, the defense might abandon lines of
independent investigation, defenses, or tnal strategies that it otherwise would have
pursued
We agree that the prosecutor's failure to respond fully to a
request may 1mpmr
the adversary process in this manner

State v. Kmght, 734 P 2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987) 6 (quotzng Unzted States v. Bagley, 473 US
667, 682 (1985))
Koontz and Pearson had their charges reduced to misdemeanors in exchange for testimony
against Mr Bisner Moreover, the state conditioned its probation recommendation for Koontz
and Pearson on testimony against Mr Bisner, again without disclosing that information to Mr
Bisner This non-disclosed information was material and denied Mr Bisner a fair trial See e.g.,

Kyles, 514 U S at 441 (disclosure of suppressed evidence "would have made a different result
reasonably possible ")

7

ll. THE ADMISSION OF THE DRUG DEBT EVIDENCE AND ALLEGED
THREATS TO KILL WERE MADE MORE PREJUDICIAL BY THE INABILITY
OF MR. BISNER TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES
LYMAN, KOONTZ, PEARSON AND SYMES ABOUT BENEFITS GIVEN BY
THE STATE.

The issues regarding the admissibility of the prior drug debt evidence and alleged debts to
kill are mainly outlined in Mr Bisner' s opening brief The error of admitting that evidence is,
however, compounded here by the state's withholding of material exculpatory evidence Here,

6

In this case, Mr Bisner made repeated requests of the state to provide any evidence of
cooperation agreements between the state and potential witnesses CR, 25, 59, 549 Even if he
had not made that request the state was nonetheless required to disclose that information because
of its exculpatory nature Umted States v. Agurs, 427 US 97, 107 (1976), State v. Jarrell, 608
P 2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980), State v. Hay, 859 P 2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)
7

These same arguments apply to the testimony of Dustin Symes who was given a
reduction in his sentence after his testimony and after Mr Bisner was convicted

8

the witnesses who testified about the 404(b) evidence regarding the alleged drug debt and threats
to kill were the same witnesses who received the benefits that were not disclosed to the defense.
The inability to impeach their credibility with the evidence withheld by the state allowed the jury
to give greater weight to the 404(b) evidence. The witnesses, who testified about the drug debt
and threats to kill, were not impeached with the evidence of reduced sentences and promises of no
prosecution because that evidence was never disclosed to the defense.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Bisner submits the remaining issues to his court as outlined in his opening brief

DATED this

&

day of March, 2001

CHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Appellant
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